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Abstract
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is explicitly mentioned in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto. These explicit references to the ICRC 
entail respect for and recognition of the ICRC as the oldest humanitarian institution. However, 
this explicitness does not imply, suggest or confirm legal superiority of the ICRC over other 
humanitarian institutions, nor does it make the ICRC the exclusive humanitarian organization. 
Humanitarian assistance can be legally and legitimately undertaken by other humanitarian or-
ganizations as well. The practical influence of the ICRC is greater than that of any other NGO. 
Arguably, the survival of the ICRC as the pre-eminent provider of humanitarian assistance is 
testimony to the fact that the “practicalities” of international law are as important as treaties. 
The practices of the undisputed subjects of international law – states and international organiza-
tions – have paved way for a half-subject of international law – the ICRC – to enhance its status.  
Keywords : Geneva Conventions, international humanitarian law, non-governmental organiza-
tion, subjects of international law, Switzerland, International Committee of the Red Cross
Submitted : 4 February 2020 | Revised : 13 March 2020 | Accepted : 18 April 2020
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a contradiction between national sovereignty – the utmost prin-
ciple of international law – and humanitarianism. Humanitarianism ‘intrudes’ 
upon national sovereign territories in order to help civilians and prisoners 
of war in conflicts and disasters. Actually, some treaties are entered into by 
states which have facilitated such intrusion. Indeed, looking at the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto, one can notice 
the paradigm shift from sovereignty to humanitarianism in international af-
fairs.1 Common Article 3(2) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions stipulates that 
humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) can offer their services to the parties even in a conflict not of an 
international character.2 This provision makes it clear that relief activities of 
humanitarian organizations are not to be seen as hostile acts of intervention in 
1  Amanda Alexander, “A Short History of International Humanitarian Law,” The European Journal of 
International Law 26, no.1 (2015): 110. 
2  Geneva Conventions for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field of 12 August 1949.
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the internal affairs of a sovereign state.3 
Likewise, Article 70 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions states that humanitarian assistance may not be considered an in-
terference in a conflict and that such assistance within the borders of a country 
is not deemed a breach of national sovereignty. Humanitarian assistance has 
thus become an exception to national sovereignty. With the humanitarian prin-
ciple having made significant headway, the institution which provides human-
itarian assistance takes on utmost importance and, at present, the ICRC would 
appear to be the foremost institution providing humanitarian assistance.  
There is an identification of sorts of the 1949 Geneva Conventions with 
the ICRC. Moreover, the neutrality of the ICRC is arguably accepted (at the 
international level) by the United Nations, individual states and non-state 
actors.4 States find it favourable to their image and in their best interest to 
engage with the ICRC,5 seeing as the Geneva Conventions of 19496 have rec-
ognized the “special role” of the ICRC.7 Moreover, and interestingly, combat-
ant groups – as non-state actors – look for eventual international recognition 
through working with the ICRC on the ground.8 Indeed, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), such as national liberation movements, also declare 
their commitment to the 1949 Geneva Conventions to enhance their standing 
internationally.9 This was the case, for instance, during the Franco-Algerian 
conflict in 1958, when the Algerian liberation movement proclaimed its adher-
ence to the Geneva Conventions for the duration of the conflict.10  
Humanitarian assistance is not just a matter of written law and treaties but 
also a matter for trust, reputation and on-the-ground practicalities, which can 
be provided by capable institutions.  This paper thereby posits an analysis of 
the ICRC, the foremost institution giving humanitarian assistance. The paper 
3  Fabian Klose, “The Colonial Testing Ground: The International Committee of the Red 
Cross and the Violent End of Empire,” Humanity Journal 2, no. 1 (June 10, 2014): 109. 
doi: 10.1353/hum.2011.0010.
4  Stephanie Roberts, “The ICRC, Neutrality and Guatemala: A Case for Improving Best Practices,” Case-
specific Briefing Paper (University of Denver: Humanitarian Aid in Complex Emergencies, 2012), page 2.
5  For instance, the Venezuelan government gave permission to the ICRC to visit prisons and detention 
centers in Venezuela. Arguably, it is an attempt by the government “to gain legitimacy with the international 
community.” The Christian Science Monitor, Venezuela’s embattled Maduro finally grants Red Cross entry, 
April 20, 2019. 
6  Article 125 and Article 142 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 
August 1949 and Article 3 and Article 4 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
of 12 August 1949. 
7  Stephanie Roberts, “The ICRC, Neutrality and Guatemala: A Case for Improving Best Practices,” 2. 
8  Ibid.
9  Fabian Klose, “The Colonial Testing Ground: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the 
Violent End of Empire,” 9. 
10  Ibid. 
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clarifies the legal basis of the ICRC and the status of the ICRC within inter-
national law, and compares the ICRC with various international institutions. 
This analysis is all the more important as new organizations have emerged 
besides the ICRC to provide humanitarian assistance,11 some of which will be 
analyzed later in this paper. 
The next section presents the argument of the paper. The paper presents 
a comparison of the ICRC with other institutions, following which the sta-
tus of Switzerland – the host country of the ICRC – as a neutral country is 
analyzed. The paper then turns to the ICRC and the International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), with the subsequent sec-
tion focusing on the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
of 1977. The paper then concludes by examining the intriguing place of the 
ICRC within the international system. 
II.  ARGUMENT OF THE ARTICLE
The argument of this paper is that the preponderance of the ICRC in con-
flict zones and its prominence in the enforcement of international humanitar-
ian law is due to the “practice” of the ICRC and the international community. 
This is a de facto situation rather than a de iure one. The activities of the ICRC 
– the presence of the ICRC in conflict zones – have determined the status 
of the ICRC.12 The more the ICRC has become operational, the more pow-
ers it has exercised.13 As a non-governmental organization (NGO), the ICRC 
has proved that NGOs may increase their powers in the international system 
alongside states and international organizations. Legally speaking, the ICRC 
is not a humanitarian organization with exclusive rights and/or privileges to 
handle humanitarian crises. Yet, in practice, it appears and behaves as if it is 
exclusive. The ICRC has what we may term a “practical” dominance, which 
may eventually be susceptible to challenge from other humanitarian organiza-
tions. 
This argument is useful in three respects: first, it proves that practice and 
custom are important to international law, and, in particular, to international 
humanitarian law. International humanitarian law is a field where practice, 
implicit understandings and reputation are important features. The written 
treaties – e.g., the four Geneva conventions of 1949 and their two Additional 
Protocols of 1977 – represent a formal treaty façade behind which an infor-
11  Stephanie Roberts, “The ICRC, Neutrality and Guatemala: A Case for Improving Best Practices,” 1. 
12  Simon Chesterman, “How ‘Public’ is Public International Law? Towards a Typology of NGOs and Civil 
Society Actors,” NUS Working Paper, 2018/003, National University of Singapore, page 12. 
13  Ibid. 
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mal and practical law-making and law enforcement take place. This creates 
a certain space for ambiguity. This is a space for creative ambiguity in inter-
national humanitarian law and  the ICRC takes advantage of this ambiguity. 
“The ICRC has been in the practice of creating law.”14  
Second, to dominate “in practice”, the ICRC has worked on formal interna-
tional law.15 Since its inception, the ICRC has attached importance to working 
with international lawyers and has made an immense effort to frame its work 
in a legal language. The ICRC has thus become, in a manner of speaking, the 
legal guardian of international humanitarian law.16 The president of the ICRC 
from 1928 to 1944 was Max Huber, who was a judge at the Permanent Court 
of International Justice from 1922 to 1939.17 For instance, it was Max Huber 
who encouraged the ICRC to concentrate upon the protection of the rights of 
prisoners of war.18 Indeed, arguably, one of the central tasks of the ICRC has 
become the inspection of prison facilities and detention camps.19 Again, it was 
Max Huber who, on February 15, 1945, called upon the governments of the 
United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and France 
and the national committees of the Red Cross to embark upon a revision of 
international humanitarian law,20 a call that ultimately led to the signing of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions,21 the bedrock of international humanitarian law. 
Third, the ICRC is to be regarded as a Swiss NGO with de facto interna-
tional legal capabilities. The ICRC is a national NGO rather than an interna-
tional one. Every national relief society has a strong relationship with the state 
in which it was established. Although national Red Cross and national Red 
Crescent societies are generally presented as civilian relief societies separate 
from their (parent) states and which aim to bring relief during both war and 
peace, they are, in fact, very closely linked to, and indeed, enmeshed with 
their national states. National civilian relief organizations are, in fact, under 
close national government supervision. The position of the ICRC vis-à-vis 
Switzerland is no exception. 
14  Leah M. Nicholls, “The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates: The International Committee of the Red 
Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law,” Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 17 (2006): 225. 
15  Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Making and Shaping the Law of Armed Conflict,” Current Legal Problems 71, 
no.1 (2018): 120. 
16  Stephanie Roberts, “The ICRC, Neutrality and Guatemala: A Case for Improving Best Practices,” 10.




19  Fabian Klose, “The Colonial Testing Ground: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the 
Violent End of Empire,” 8. 
20  Ibid., 2. 
21  Ibid. 
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Almost every national relief society is a semi-official instrumentality of 
the government. National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies act in the 
interest of their governments – they are not nonpartisan organizations.22 This 
close relationship is clearly visible, for instance, in the case of the United 
States’ (U.S.) Red Cross.23 The U.S. Red Cross is a quasi-governmental or-
ganization24 and an integral unit of the government of the U.S.25 Likewise, 
the ICRC is to be regarded as a Swiss national organization that identifies 
with and can be identified with Switzerland, rather than a self-standing/self-
sufficient international organization. 
To further identify the ICRC, the article will now look at four institutions 
– the Amnesty International (AI), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNI-
CEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Those institutions are focused 
upon because they have significant similarities and differences with the ICRC. 
And, there is a larger lesson to be drawn from the discussion of those institu-
tions and their comparison with the ICRC: an NGO – e.g., the ICRC – may be 
successful in enhancing its standing notwithstanding the formal limitations of 
public international law. 
III. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AI) 
Amnesty International (AI) is a non-governmental organization (NGO) 
based in London. AI is not a subject of international law but is a subject of a 
national law – namely, UK law. It does not have international legal personality 
and cannot sign treaties with governments or international organizations. AI 
remains a pressure group. It holds informal talks with government representa-
tives and possesses consultative status in the Economic and Social Council 
of the United Nations (UN), in the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights and in the Council of Europe. Holding informal talks with govern-
ments and having consultative status in these institutions does not give AI 
international legal personality. 
Likewise, the ICRC is an NGO. The ICRC is similar to AI in that the 
ICRC holds informal talks with governments, too. The ICRC argues that this 
informality gives it access to prisoners of war and secures the cooperation of 
22  Fabian Klose, “The Colonial Testing Ground: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the 
Violent End of Empire,” 5-6.    
23  Wesley A. “Sturges, Legal Status of the Red Cross,” Michigan Law Review 56, no.1 (1957): 9, 11-12, 
14-15, 17-19, 29-30, 32. 
24  Ibid., 15, 30.
25  Ibid., 30. 
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governments. Yet, it is still questionable as to whether the ICRC is subject of 
(and to) international law. That is, the ICRC seems more like an active play-
er in humanitarian assistance; it is admitted as an interlocutor by individual 
states and the United Nations more often than not. This is obvious from the 
fact that the ICRC has almost always been present in conflict zones and areas 
that have suffered natural disaster. 
IV. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF)  
The UNICEF is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly based in New York, whereas the ICRC is an NGO based in Geneva, 
Switzerland. The UNICEF was established by the UN General Assembly. Ar-
guably, the UNICEF is semi-autonomous, in that it can hold and dispose of 
property. However, that does not give UNICEF full international legal per-
sonality. In this respect, UNICEF is similar to the ICRC. Without having full 
international legal personality, both institutions act as if they have one, and 
both are active on the international scene. UNICEF is financed by government 
contributions and by donations by private individuals, corporations, NGOs 
and international organizations. The ICRC is also financed by similar actors. 
There is a risk that these contributions and donations curtail the independence 
and the autonomy, that is, the ‘self-standing’ quality, of both UNICEF and the 
ICRC. 
V. THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
REFUGEES (UNHCR) 
Similar to UNICEF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations (UN) General Assem-
bly. It was established by the latter and is part of the UN Secretariat. The 
UNCHR is semi-autonomous and has partial international legal personality, as 
evidenced by the UNCHR’s authority to conclude treaties directly with states. 
(UNHCR Statute, paras 1,8 (b) and 16).  Contribution to the UNHCR budget 
comes from governments, the European Union (EU) and the private sector, 
mirroring the funding behind both UNICEF and the ICRC. As such, the same 
questions of independence are relevant here as well. 
There is an interesting property of the UNHCR in terms of comparisons 
with the ICRC: Article 35 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees26 and Article II of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
26  The Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (entered into force 22 April 1954).
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gees27 both refer to the supervisory function entrusted to the UNHCR. Both 
provisions oblige state parties to cooperate with the UNHCR; they do not 
leave any other institutional choice to state and no alternative institution is 
permitted when dealing with refugees. The UNHCR is thus unavoidable and 
has a legal monopoly. Due, in most likelihood, to the aforementioned privi-
leges and the near-monopoly on refugee issues, the UNCHR has what may be 
considered a conservative organizational culture.28 Some argue that the UN-
CHR is disdainful of outsiders’ views.29 
In contrast, the ICRC has no such legal monopoly. The 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions and the Additional Protocols, as will be discussed in the later sections 
of this paper, allow alternative relief organizations other than the ICRC to 
operate. Although the ICRC is advanced as the guardian and the promoter of 
international humanitarian law,30 the ICRC is not the exclusive institution that 
fulfills that role. 
VI. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS)
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which is based in Switzer-
land, is interesting in that it was established by an international treaty among 
governments while also being a company limited by shares under Swiss na-
tional law, thus giving it a dual structure. Switzerland – one of the parties to 
the treaty establishing the BIS – imparted a national legal charter to the BIS. 
The central bank of each member country subscribes to the capital in the BIS. 
That is, the BIS is owned by national central banks. Central banks participate 
in the operation of the BIS, not governments directly. 
The BIS is an international organization vested with international legal 
personality because, notwithstanding its internal corporate structure, the BIS 
was established by an intergovernmental agreement – viz., a treaty. Arguably, 
the dual structure of the BIS strengthens the status of the BIS. The Bank has 
an international character owing to its treaty origin while its internal structure 
is that of a company limited by shares under Swiss law. Interestingly, a similar 
dual structure – both international and national – has not been adopted for the 
ICRC.  The ICRC, in contrast, possesses a single structure that excludes states 
27  The Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (entered into force 22 April 1954).
28  David P. Forsythe, “The ICRC: A Unique Humanitarian Protagonist,” International Review of the Red 
Cross 89, no. 865 (March 2007): 89. 
29  Ibid. 
30  “The Basics of International Humanitarian Law,” The International Committee of the Red Cross, ac-
cessed on July 5, 2019 at https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0850.pdf;
Amanda Alexander, “A short history of international humanitarian law,” European Journal of International 
Law 26, no.1 (2015): 110.  
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– that is, the ICRC is a wholly Swiss private association without an intergov-
ernmental dimension. 
The BIS deals with intergovernmental financial settlement. This is of a 
typical public international law nature. The BIS is an international organiza-
tion fulfilling a public international duty. Indeed, the headquarters agreement 
between the BIS and the Swiss Federal Council, 31 and the host country agree-
ments between the BIS and China32 and Mexico,33 expressly recognize the BIS 
as an international organization. True, the ICRC has a headquarters agreement 
with Switzerland, too, and this may be evidence as to the international legal 
personality of the ICRC. Indeed, this headquarters agreement clearly recog-
nizes the international legal personality of the ICRC, though it does not refer 
to the ICRC as an international organization34 
Be that as it may, there is no intergovernmental treaty establishing the 
ICRC. The ICRC is a wholly Swiss domestic institution established by a 
Swiss domestic act. Ironically, the ICRC is engaged in a field that is character-
ized and structured by the norms of classical public international law, just like 
the BIS, whereas the ICRC’s foundation and structure are only of a national 
nature. The question thus arises as to why a Swiss national non-governmental 
organization (NGO) is so prominent and relevant, and this question leads us to 
examine the status of Switzerland as the host country of the ICRC. 
31  Article 2 (1), Agreement Between the Swiss Federal Council and the Bank for International Settlements 
to Determine the Bank’s Legal Status in Switzerland 2003: “The Swiss Federal Council shall guarantee 
to the Bank the autonomy and freedom of action to which it is entitled as an international organisation.” 
Accessible at https://www.bis.org/about/headquart-en.pdf (accessed on 12 August 2019). 
32  Article 3 (1), Host Country Agreement Between the Bank for International Settlements and the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China Relating to the Establishment and Status of a Representative Office 
of the Bank for International Settlements in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China 1998: “The Government shall guarantee to the Bank the autonomy and freedom of action 
to which it is entitled as an international organization of central banks and monetary authorities based on 
international treaties between States.” Accessible at https://www.bis.org/about/hostctryhk.pdf (accessed 
on 12 August 2019). 
33  Article 2, Host Country Agreement Between the Bank for International Settlements and the United Mexi-
can States Relating to the Establishment and Status of a Representative Office of the Bank for International 
Settlements in Mexico 2001: “The State shall at all times ensure that the Bank benefits from or is granted 
in all respects treatment at least as favourable as that granted by the State to any other intergovernmental 
organisation in the State. With regard to fiscal matters the Bank shall benefit from treatment at least as 
favourable as that granted generally by the State to intergovernmental organisations in the State...” Acces-
sible at https://www.bis.org/about/basictexts-en.pdf (accessed on 12 August 2019). 
34  Article 1, Agreement Between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal 
Council to determine the legal status of the Committee in Switzerland 1993: “The Federal Council recog-
nizes the international juridical personality and the legal capacity in Switzerland of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (hereinafter referred to as the Committee or the ICRC), whose functions are laid 
down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 and in the Statutes of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.” Accessible at https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/
agreement-between-icrc-and-switzerland (Accessed on 12 August 2019). 
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VII. SWITZERLAND 
Article 11(6) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Cres-
cent Movement states: “The International Conference shall not modify either 
the Statutes of the International Committee (of the Red Cross) or the Con-
stitution of the (International) Federation (of the Red Cross and Red Cres-
cent Societies) nor take decisions contrary to such statutes.” The International 
Conference is the supreme deliberative body of the International Red Cross 
where the representatives of the national relief organizations, the International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and, most importantly, the national 
governments parties to the Geneva Conventions meet together. This provision 
clearly demonstrates that, notwithstanding the participation of states in the 
International Conference, the latter can amend the legal status and basic rules 
of neither the ICRC nor the IFRC. Therefore, both the ICRC and the IFRC – 
two NGOs established in Switzerland – are under the cover and protection of 
Swiss national law and are immune from intervention from the international 
conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.  In this respect, an 
analysis of Switzerland’s status in international law is necessary. 
Switzerland is the depositary for the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in fact 
convened the Diplomatic Conference of 1949, which led to the conclusion of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which constitute the bedrock of international 
humanitarian law.35 Indeed, the ICRC prepared the drafts of the Geneva Con-
ventions that the 1949 Diplomatic Conference worked upon.36 In the same 
manner, the ICRC prepared the drafts of two Additional Protocols of 1977, 
which were presented to the 1977 Diplomatic Conference, again convened by 
Switzerland.37 Hence, modern international humanitarian law – starting after 
World War II – is based upon the close cooperation between Switzerland and 
the ICRC. It must be stressed at this juncture that the neutrality of both were a 
great asset in their success in these initiatives. 
As mentioned before, there is a headquarters agreement between the ICRC 
and the Swiss Confederation to determine the legal status of the ICRC in Swit-
zerland.38 The ICRC aimed to confirm its international status and indepen-
dence from Switzerland through this headquarters agreement. Every public 
international organization seated in Switzerland has a headquarters agreement 
with Switzerland. Arguably, such a headquarters agreement between Switzer-
35  Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Making and Shaping the Law of Armed Conflict,” 121-122. 
36  Ibid.,122. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Preamble, Agreement Between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal 
Council to determine the legal status of the Committee in Switzerland, 19 March 1993.
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land and the ICRC likens the ICRC to classical public international law or-
ganizations, and bolsters its legal standing and status in public international 
law. Indeed, Article 1 of the Switzerland-ICRC headquarters agreement states: 
“The (Swiss) Federal Council recognizes the international juridical per-
sonality and the legal capacity in Switzerland of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross.”39
The counter argument is that this is merely a domestic agreement between 
Switzerland and a legal person domiciled in Switzerland – the ICRC. The 
aforementioned Article 1 merely indicates the view of Switzerland on the 
ICRC – it does not definitely settle the question of the international legal per-
sonality of the ICRC on the international plane. True, the headquarters agree-
ment provides for the inviolability of the ICRC premises,40 the inviolability 
of ICRC archives,41 the inviolability for all ICRC papers and documents,42 the 
immunity of the ICRC from legal process and execution,43 and immunity from 
legal process for the ICRC President, the members of the ICRC and the ICRC 
staff and experts44 – all reminiscent of the privileges of classical international 
organizations having their headquarters in Switzerland. 
Still, Article 1 of this headquarters agreement should be seen as represent-
ing a unilateral attitude by Switzerland in respect of the ICRC. Switzerland’s 
conferral of some privileges to the ICRC through the agreement does not give 
the latter international legal personality. This does not make the ICRC a sub-
ject of public international law. The headquarters agreement between Switzer-
land and the ICRC is not a treaty, viz., an international agreement under in-
ternational law. Rather, it is a wholly domestic transaction within the confines 
of Switzerland, Swiss law and Swiss territory. This local–domestic–national 
agreement cannot grant the ICRC an international legal standing. 
True, Switzerland’s neutrality has enabled the creation of the ICRC.45 In 
the past, the law of armed conflict – international humanitarian law – was 
39  Article 1, Agreement Between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal 
Council to determine the legal status of the Committee in Switzerland, 19 March 1993.
40  Article 3, Agreement Between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal 
Council to determine the legal status of the Committee in Switzerland, 19 March 1993.
41  Article 4, Agreement Between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal 
Council to determine the legal status of the Committee in Switzerland, 19 March 1993.
42  Article 11, Agreement Between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal 
Council to determine the legal status of the Committee in Switzerland, 19 March 1993. 
43  Article 5, Agreement Between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal 
Council to determine the legal status of the Committee in Switzerland, 19 March 1993.
44  Article 11, Agreement Between The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal 
Council to determine the legal status of the Committee in Switzerland, 19 March 1993.
45  Alex de Waal, “Dangers of Discretion: International Law,” London Review of Books 21, no. 2 (January 
1999) : 4-5. 
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closely linked to the notion of neutrality. Due to a lack of collective security 
organizations in the 19th century, neutral states were predominant in the op-
eration of the law of armed conflict. Indeed, the historical pre-eminence of 
Switzerland in the law of armed conflict was heavily linked to its neutrality. 
The establishment and the development of the ICRC in Switzerland should 
thus be seen in this context. Due to what may be seen as a historical neutral-
ity, Switzerland was regarded as the ideal place to establish an institution of 
neutral humanitarian assistance. 
However, in modern times, where collective security organizations such 
as the UN exist, the notion of neutrality has become problematic: “if force 
may only be used lawfully with the United Nations (UN) authorization (UN 
Chapter VII), or in self-defence,46 many would argue that there is no room 
for neutrality. Third States must follow the directions of the UN, or side with 
the State defending itself against aggression.”47 In particular, if a country is a 
member of the UN, one can no more speak of the neutrality of that country. 
That is, the notion of collective security through the UN has replaced the no-
tion of neutrality. 
Switzerland became a member of the UN in 2002. As a UN member, its 
(absolute) neutrality has been thus put into question. Under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the UN may oblige Switzerland to participate in collective secu-
rity actions – that is, enforcement measures. From a legal perspective, Swit-
zerland cannot shun or avoid these obligations. Permanent neutral countries, 
such as Switzerland, are not exempt from participating in Security Council 
sanctions against another country. While under Article 25 of the United Na-
tions Charter, Switzerland has to comply with decisions of the UN Security 
Council,48 Article 2(5) of the UN Charter states: 
All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action 
it takes in accordance with the present Charter and shall refrain from 
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking 
preventive or enforcement action.
These two aforementioned provisions cancel out the right to neutrality 
of the UN members. There is thus an incompatibility between neutrality and 
membership of the United Nations.49 Importantly, Switzerland cannot trade 
46  Article 51 Charter of United Nations signed June 26, 1945. 
47  Vaughan Lowe, International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), 287.
48  Article 25, Charter of United Nations signed June 26, 1945: “The members of the United Nations agree 
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” 
49  Alexander R. McLin, “The ICRC: An Alibi for Swiss Neutrality,” Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 9 (1999): 501. 
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with belligerent states, whereas in the past, before the establishment of the 
UN system, such trade was permissible.50 Besides, Switzerland has the legal 
right to give aid to a country which has been attacked by another in the name 
of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. That is, the 
UN collective security system has replaced the old system where permanently 
neutral states fulfilled an important function. 
The question of the protection of the ICRC under Swiss law has never 
gone away. Since 1864, when the ICRC was founded in Geneva, Switzer-
land has organized a flurry of conferences on international humanitarian law,51 
which have arguably created a close association between the Swiss state’s 
neutrality and the neutrality of the ICRC.52 Yet it may also be noted that the 
ICRC is and has been too closely connected to Swiss politics and to the Swiss 
business world, with a visible regular rotation of notable figures between the 
Swiss government, Swiss corporations and the head of the ICRC. That is, 
there has always existed a close proximity between the Swiss government, 
Swiss business circles and the ICRC.53 For instance, the current head of the 
ICRC is a former high-ranking diplomat in the Swiss Foreign Ministry.54 
Moreover, at a symbolic level, the Swiss ‘national’ nature of the ICRC 
is manifest in the latter’s emblem. While the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) uses both the red cross and the red 
crescent in its emblem, the ICRC uses only the red cross with a white back-
ground – the inverse of the Swiss national flag – as its emblem,55 which may be 
seen as further evidence that the ICRC is a Swiss national institution. Indeed, 
it has been disclosed in Article XVIII of the 1906 Geneva Convention that the 
emblem was conceived in a way so as to honour Switzerland by reversing the 
colours its (federal) flag.56 Furthermore, the ICRC’s informal and confidential 
way of working smacks of the role of Switzerland in the international com-
munity. Switzerland has hosted many arbitrations and negotiations – some 
50  Rune Müller, “The Law of Neutrality – Obstruction or Completion to the System of Collective Secu-
rity?” (working paper Faculty of Law Lunds University, 2013), 8, 10, 17. 
51  Frederic Burnand, “The ICRC as a Swiss Political Tool,” Swissinfo.ch, September 4, 2017, https://www.
swissinfo.ch/eng/dangerous-liaisons-_the-icrc-as-a-swiss-political-tool/43487480
52  Ibid.
53  Ibid. 
54  “The President of the ICRC, Peter Maurer,” International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed on 
August 12, 2019, https://www.icrc.org/en/president-icrc-peter-maurer.
55  Leah M. Nicholls, “The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates: the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law,” Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 17 (2006): 228. 
56  Article XVIII, the 1906 Geneva Convention: “Out of respect to Switzerland the heraldic emblem of the 
red cross on a white ground, formed by the reversal of the federal colors, is continued as the emblem and 
distinctive sign of the sanitary services of armies.” A similar provision exists also in Article 19 of the 1929 
Geneva Convention. Wesley A. Sturges, “Legal Status of the Red Cross,” Michigan Law Review 56, no.1 
(1957): 5. 
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public, but many, also, off the record.57
The next section offers a more focused analysis of the ICRC, with a view 
to understanding its nature and status. 
VIII.  THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS (ICRC)
The liberal world order established after World War II is based upon the 
notions and bodies of international organizations, international treaties and 
law and civil society. All aim to fill the gaps that exist between nations and the 
ICRC should arguably be seen in this light, as part of the liberal world order. 
The ICRC fills some of the ‘gaps’ left by states, international organizations 
and international law. The insidious relationship among governments and the 
consequent loopholes in the laws of war have often necessitated the inter-
vention of an NGO, the ICRC, as a neutral go-between and an intermediary 
between governments. The luck and the uniqueness of the ICRC stems from 
the fact that its founders have noticed the necessity for an NGO in the conduct 
and regulation of war and humanitarian disasters so much early on – that is, 
in 1863. From then on, the ICRC has helped identify questions which need be 
resolved and for that it convenes expert groups and engages in debates with 
states.58
Some international legal provisions give a robust role to the ICRC in de-
veloping international law. Under the Statutes of the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement (which were adopted by the International Con-
ference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent),59 the ICRC has a role in devel-
oping international humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. 
Article 5(2)(g) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement states that the ICRC is to work for the understanding and dissemi-
nation of knowledge of international humanitarian law and to prepare any 
development thereof.60 
Moreover, the special position of the ICRC is recognized in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949: Article 125 of Geneva Convention III pertaining to the 
treatment of prisoners of war states:
57  Daniel Warner, “Switzerland as a Symbol of Peace and Switzerland 2.0,” Swissinfo.ch, February 9, 
2015, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/society/opinion_switzerland-as-a-symbol-of-peace-and-switzer-
land-2.0/41262066. 
58  Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Making and Shaping the Law of Armed Conflict,” 146-147.  
59  Article 5(2)(g), Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, adopted 21 Decem-
ber 2017 (entered into force 1 January 2018).
60  Ibid. 
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“The Detaining Power may limit the number of societies and organiza-
tions whose delegates are allowed to carry out their activities in its terri-
tory and under its supervision.... The special position of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in this field shall be recognized and respected 
at all times.” (emphasis added)
Interestingly, there is no clarification of the term “special position”. Does 
“the special position” mean that the decisions and the opinions of the ICRC 
overrule those of other humanitarian organizations? Does the ICRC have pri-
ority over other humanitarian organizations? If so, in what way?
Be that as it may, visibility in legal documents is an asset. The ICRC 
has benefited immensely from being explicitly mentioned in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols. Arguably, the ICRC’s power 
may well stem from this visibility. For example, by being explicitly referred 
to, the ICRC seems to be in an advantageous position with regard to the Mixed 
Medical Commission, which visits and examines prisoners of war (under the 
auspices of Geneva Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War and its annexes).61 
Nevertheless, one cannot speak of the ICRC’s unique status in giving hu-
manitarian assistance. Visibility does not ensure monopoly. Other institutions 
may also provide humanitarian assistance. True, the ICRC is the only institu-
tion explicitly named in the 1949 Geneva Conventions as a controlling author-
ity. Nevertheless, this explicitness does not mean that it is the only institution 
to deal with humanitarian law and humanitarian issues. Neither explicitness 
nor special position gives the ICRC a monopoly on matters of humanitarian 
assistance. Hence the motivation of the ICRC to further develop its standing 
through the study of customary international law. 
The intense effort of the ICRC to bring together and publish customary 
international humanitarian law rules should be seen in this light.62 The ICRC 
has been heavily engaged in declaring customary international law. The ICRC 
Customary International Humanitarian Law study consists of a list of 161 
rules of customary international humanitarian law, together with a commen-
tary and the supporting practice.63 This study – the list of customary rules – is 
important in that it is becoming a handy source for governments and non-state 
61  e.g., Article 11, Article 81, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 
August 1949
62  IHL Database, International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed on 12 August 2019, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home.
63  Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, “Customary International Humanitarian Law,” in 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 2, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, 
eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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entities to identify customary international law. The study is conceived as a 
shortcut to a detailed exploration of complex customary international law.64 
The more a custom becomes visible and accessible, the more it turns into a 
norm. Due to the ease of access to the ICRC study, the ICRC will increase its 
visibility and power too. 
Normally, governments and international organizations do not declare 
customary international law in a proactive way. They can be said to be reac-
tive, in that they react to crises as they unfold. It is these reactions that shed 
light on a certain view of customary international law. From time to time, it 
may be difficult or even impossible to identify a rule of customary internation-
al law by looking at these spontaneous reactions. The practice and the belief 
(opinio iuris) of the international community in respect of a specific situation 
may be difficult to identify. There may exist a complex picture where it may 
be difficult to dredge out the practice and the opinio iuris, which form the 
two constituents of custom. Hence the importance of the study of customary 
international law by the ICRC. By bringing together the rules of customary 
international law, the ICRC actually establishes a handy and practical instru-
ment for the actors of the international community and for international courts 
and tribunals. 
“The ICRC’s identification of a rule of customary international law can 
prove constitutive of a rule of customary international law.”65 Arguably, ascer-
taining custom may be considered a form of creating and making custom.66 By 
clarifying ambiguous rules and by identifying scattered customary rules, the 
ICRC is, in fact, to some extent, ‘making’ or ‘creating’ customary internation-
al law.67 The border between opinio iuris and state practice may be difficult to 
delineate as there is often overlap between the two.68 Moreover, what a state or 
states declare to believe may be vastly different from what they actually prac-
tice.69 Hence, customary international law may appear somewhat nebulous.   
The “overburdened judges often rely on scholarly works as definitive evi-
dence of customary international law or general principles instead of conduct-
ing independent assessments of primary sources.”70 Hence, the ICRC gives 
64  Leah M. Nicholls, “The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates: The International Committee of the Red 
Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law,” 232. 
65  Sandesh Sivakumaran, Making and Shaping the Law of Armed Conflict, Current Legal Problems, vol.71, 
no.1, 2018, p.126, 135.
66  Ibid., p.160. 
67  Leah M. Nicholls, “The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates: the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law,” Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 17, (2006): 225. 
68  Ibid., p.243. 
69  Ibid., p.246. 
70  Ibid., p.224. 
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them a shortcut and this study of customary international law by the ICRC 
in turn makes it influential.71 The ICRC has made its voice apparent in the 
formation and functioning of international humanitarian law.72  It has been 
forming a database while its study has been bringing together some practices 
in humanitarian assistance.73 Hence, the ICRC is deeply involved in the practi-
calities of international law. Arguably, the ICRC, apart from the direct support 
it gets from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (treaty law), wishes to engage 
in customary law to further justify its engagement in humanitarian assistance, 
as treaty law and customary law are the two most important sources of inter-
national law. This ICRC study highlights the prominence of the ICRC as a 
customary law-making body, and not merely a passive receiver of the status 
granted it by the international community.
The status of the ICRC in the international system has always been an 
important issue. Interestingly, notwithstanding the references to the ICRC in 
the 1949 Geneva conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto, the 
legal basis of the ICRC is Swiss national law. The ICRC is not an international 
organization but a private association registered in Switzerland. It is not sov-
ereign but under the sovereignty of Switzerland and is a private Swiss body/
membership corporation under the authority of Swiss civil law.74 
Interestingly, though based upon Swiss national law, the ICRC has been 
given an international humanitarian mandate by the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 
Though a Swiss non-governmental organization (NGO), the ICRC has been 
given a mandate in intergovernmental relations in times of war and natural 
disasters. Arguably, the functions assigned to the ICRC by the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto justify the attribution 
of international personality to the ICRC.75 In this context, in order to fulfil 
these functions, the ICRC needs a certain international legal personality. 
The existence of international legal personality due to the functions ful-
filled is common in international law. In the Reparations case, the Internation-
al Court of Justice (ICJ) has stated that the United Nations (UN) is a subject 
of international law since it, in fact, had functions and rights which can be 
71  Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Making and Shaping the Law of Armed Conflict,” 134. 
72  Leah M. Nicholls, “The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates: the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law,” 251. 
73  IHL Database, International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed on 12 August 2019, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home.
74  Wesley A. Sturges, “Legal Status of the Red Cross,” Michigan Law Review 56, no.1 (1957): 3. 
75  Tarcisio Gazzini, “A Unique non-State actor: the International Committee of the Red Cross,” Human 
Rights & International Legal Discourse 2010, no. 1 (2010):7. 
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explained only by possessing international personality.76 That is, the perfor-
mance of functions creates a certain international legal personality. In this 
context, an entity becomes subject of international law due to its practice in 
fulfilment of its duties. 
Likewise, the ICRC benefits from the functions it fulfils. In fact, these 
functions are not specific to the ICRC – as the 10th section of this paper on the 
Geneva Conventions will further make clear. But the ICRC, being a pioneer 
organization via its immense scale of activities and its multiple initiatives in 
humanitarian assistance and in international humanitarian law, has acquired a 
de facto powerful status. This, therefore, makes the ICRC a sui generis NGO, 
although with admittedly more powers and greater recognition than other 
NGOs.  
On the one hand, in formal legal terms, the ICRC possesses a more pow-
erful status in comparison with other classical NGOs due to its international 
mandate, as granted by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Statutes of the 
International Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement. On the other hand, 
in practical terms, the ICRC’s prominent role on the ground is recognized 
by states and international institutions. For instance, the ICRC has observer 
status in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, which gives it a cer-
tain “practical” international legal personality. Still, this personality is not as 
powerful or as clear as that of a classical public international organization. 
This partial international personality of the ICRC comes from merely being 
recognized as an interlocutor by governments and international organizations. 
This purported international legal personality is not anchored in any writ-
ten international legal instrument. Interestingly, there is provision neither in 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions nor in the 1977 Additional Protocols on the 
international legal personality of the ICRC. There is no obligation on states 
that are party to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to recog-
nize the personality of the ICRC.77 Hence, it is not a formal legal basis as such 
but the way the ICRC is treated in practice by governments and international 
organizations – such as the United Nations (UN) – that determines the person-
ality of the ICRC. Therefore, the ICRC is, to a degree, a sui generis subject 
of international law, a status that is, in and of itself, prone to some ambiguity.
This ambiguity has consequences in respect of the ICRC’s responsibility 
for its wrongful acts. Although the ICRC promotes international humanitarian 
law and arguably has a partial international legal personality, it has no respon-
sibility under international law. Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions are 
76  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949, para.179. 
77  Tarcisio Gazzini, “A Unique non-State actor: the International Committee of the Red Cross,” 3. 
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international law instruments, and although they refer to the ICRC regularly, 
interestingly those conventions do not provide for the ICRC’s responsibility 
under international law. The 1949 Geneva Conventions grant an explicit role 
to the ICRC in humanitarian assistance and international humanitarian law-
making. However, contradictorily, the ICRC is not held responsible for its 
internationally wrongful acts. 
From one perspective, this is natural in that, not being subjects of inter-
national law, NGOs cannot be held directly responsible in international law 
for their wrongful acts. The ICRC, as an NGO, cannot be held directly re-
sponsible under international law. The responsibility of the ICRC is limited 
to the confines of Swiss law. That is, Switzerland is to be held responsible for 
the wrongful acts of the ICRC. This is ironic (and contradictory) in that the 
ICRC’s field of activity takes place within the sphere of international law in 
general and within the domain of international humanitarian law in particular. 
States are not members of the ICRC’s governing body, the General As-
sembly. Membership of the ICRC administration is limited to Swiss persons 
and (only) Swiss nationals may be members of the ICRC General Assembly. 
The ICRC has not been established by a treaty between states;78 it is a Swiss 
domestic institution established by a Swiss domestic act. The ICRC is to an-
swer directly to Switzerland – not directly to states. Hence, this imbalance 
between the role of the ICRC in humanitarian assistance and in international 
law on the one hand and its lack of responsibility under international law on 
the other constitutes a legal problem. The ICRC’s actions, as well as its power 
and its status, would suggest, or indeed, demand that it take on some formal 
responsibility in and under international law. 
Shall Switzerland – the home state of the ICRC – therefore be held re-
sponsible for the internationally wrongful acts of the ICRC or should this 
responsibility be taken on by the sponsor governments of the ICRC? Finan-
cially, the ICRC is dependent primarily upon states, with the primary donors 
of the ICRC being the United States of America (U.S.), Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom (UK).79 The U.S. seems the foremost among the ICRC’s do-
nors, providing the largest percentage of its annual budget.80 Yet, if local Swiss 
public contributions and private donations are considered, the Swiss seem the 
largest donors by far on a per capita basis.81 Thus, there is a strong financial 
78  Leah M. Nicholls, “The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates: the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law,” 227. 
79  Alexander R. McLin, “The ICRC: An Alibi for Swiss Neutrality,” 511. 
80  Sonni Efron, “GOP Committee Targets International Red Cross,” Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2005. 
81  Alexander R. McLin, “The ICRC: An Alibi for Swiss Neutrality,” 511-512.
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link between Switzerland and the ICRC.82 
Is the ICRC therefore under Swiss “control”? The question is certainly 
problematic as the term control is contestable and any such ‘control’ may be 
difficult to prove. Can the ICRC then be said to be under the direction of, or di-
rected by, donor governments? If yes, Switzerland and the donor states would 
be held responsible for the wrongful acts of the ICRC. Indeed, Article 8 of the 
UN’s International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) states: 
“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act 
of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in 
fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of that 
State in carrying out the conduct.” (emphases added)
However, Article 20 of the 1993 Host State Agreement between the ICRC 
and the Swiss Federal Council (which determines the legal status of the ICRC 
in Switzerland) states:83 
“Switzerland shall not incur, by reason of the activity of the ICRC on 
its territory, any international responsibility for acts or omissions of the 
ICRC or its staff.”
However, this provision can have validity only in Swiss law, not public 
international law. Switzerland, via an agreement with the ICRC, cannot deter-
mine the question of international responsibility for the acts of the ICRC as 
Switzerland does not have such authority in international law. Any such provi-
sion with regard to the issue of Swiss responsibility for the acts of the ICRC 
can only be considered a private understanding between Switzerland and the 
ICRC. This understanding binds neither international courts nor other govern-
ments or international organizations. 
In this respect, a look at the International Federation of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) can further enhance our understanding of the 
ICRC.
82  Ibid., 512. 
83  The Agreement between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Council 




IX.  INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND 
RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES (IFRC)
Similar to the ICRC, the IFRC is a non-governmental organization (NGO), 
based in Geneva, Switzerland. The IFRC members are not states but national 
relief societies (Article 1, Constitution of the IFRC) – that is, national Red 
Cross and Red Crescent societies. In other words, the IFRC is the umbrella 
NGO of a group or a collective of national NGOs. The IFRC represents na-
tional relief societies in the international field under Article 5/1/B/d of the 
Constitution of the IFRC.84 Yet, the text of that article does not contain the 
term “only”. That is, the IFRC cannot claim to be the only representative of 
national societies. There is no legal monopoly of the IFRC for the representa-
tion of national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. Another institution can 
also represent national Red Crescent and Red Cross societies. In legal terms, 
there are no obstacles to the cooperation of national Red Cross and Red Cres-
cent societies under the roof of another NGO.
In fact, the IFRC mitigates the opposition to an exclusive Swiss adminis-
tration of the ICRC. Indeed, the IFRC was established in 1919 (as the “League 
of Red Cross Societies”) under the presidency of Gustave Ador, who was at 
that time both a Swiss Federal Councillor (and thus a member of the Swiss 
government) and the president of the ICRC.85 By engaging national Red Cross 
and Red Crescent societies worldwide, the IFRC has provided a level playing 
field for national relief societies. Arguably, it was envisaged that the ICRC 
could keep its exclusively Swiss governing structure thanks to the IFRC. The 
IFRC has become a shield of sorts and a pretext for the ICRC not to open or 
expand its governing membership to non-Swiss nationals. 
Similar to the ICRC, the IFRC is a private association under Swiss law. 
Article 6 of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement (the Movement) and Article 1 of the Constitution of the IFRC state 
that the IFRC is a “corporate body with legal personality.”86 This is not in-
ternational legal personality but a personality within the confines of Swiss 
national law. Within both provisions, there is a deliberate lack of the term 
“international” qualifying the term “legal personality”. 
84  The Agreement between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Council 
1993 accessed on 12 August 2019 https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/agreement-between-icrc-and-swit-
zerland. 
85  Benedikt von Tscharner, Max Huber, in Benedict von Tscharner, Inter Gentes: Statesmen, Diplomats, Po-
litical Thinkers, trans. Nathasha Proietto, (Infolio editions & Editions de Penthes, 2012) in Thomas Cottier, 
Isabel Kölliker & Jack Williams, The Anthology of Swiss Legal Culture, Legal Anthology, 3-4 accessed on 
6 July 2019, http://www.legalanthology.ch/international-relations/5-biographies-of-authors/max-huber-2.
86  Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted by the 25th International 
Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1986, amended in 19951 and 2006. 
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Because of its mandate as given by the Statutes of the Movement, by the 
headquarters agreement between the IFRC and Switzerland, by the IFRC’s 
host agreements with other countries and by the IFRC’s observer status with 
the United Nations, the IFRC may be considered an “NGO with a functional 
international legal personality.”87 The IFRC possesses a practical international 
legal personality – to the extent it is necessary for the international duties that 
fall upon the IFRC.  
Similar to the ICRC, the IFRC is a Swiss national NGO engaged in interna-
tional humanitarian action that is recognized by governments and internation-
al organizations for only functional purposes. The IFRC’s “functional” inter-
national legal personality signifies that it has only “partial” international legal 
personality. This is a limited international legal personality whose boundaries 
are not clear-cut and which are open to challenge from states, international 
organizations and other NGOs. The IFRC is not an international governmental 
organization possessing a full-fledged international legal personality. 
In fact, the functional international legal personality of the IFRC is un-
derstandable due to its wide and genuinely representative base in the interna-
tional community and its being recognized as an interlocutor. In this context, 
the IFRC has a stronger international legal basis than that of the ICRC, in 
that national relief societies worldwide are members of the IFRC. While the 
ICRC administration is composed of only Swiss nationals and the latter are 
elected through co-optation88 – a mysterious term in itself – in an ambiguous 
way rather than through a democratic election, the IFRC administration is 
democratically elected by the worldwide national relief societies in a trans-
parent way. In contrast to the exclusively Swiss governed ICRC, the IFRC is 
governed by all kinds of nationalities.
Finally, a closer look at the positive law provisions and at the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and its 1977 Additional Protocols can give us a clearer overview 
of the ICRC.   
87  Sigrid Mehring, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, (Max Planck Ency-
lopedia of Public International Law, February 2016) para.8. 
88  Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Article 5(1): “The International 
Committee, founded in Geneva in 1863 and formally recognized in the Geneva Conventions and by Inter-
national Conferences of the Red Cross, is an independent humanitarian organization having a status of its 
own. It co-opts its members from among Swiss citizens.”  
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X.  THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE 1977 ADDI-
TIONAL PROTOCOLS 
It is crucial to point out that international humanitarian law is more than 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions89 and the 1977 Additional Protocols90 thereto. 
One cannot boil down humanitarian assistance and international humanitar-
ian law to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols alone. They 
do not monopolize humanitarian activities; the field of humanitarian activity 
is far wider. The humanitarian activities of other humanitarian organizations 
outside the system of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols are 
legal and do not violate international law. What counts is the consent of the 
parties to the conflict or that of the country experiencing the natural disaster 
to intervention and intermediation by the humanitarian assistance institution. 
Therefore, one should not only focus on explicit references to the ICRC in 
these treaties in order to locate and position the ICRC in international humani-
tarian law. 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols ex-
plicitly refer to the ICRC. As mentioned above, implications of this explicit-
ness are immense. The prominence and the popularity of the ICRC are par-
tially explained by this explicitness, which does not give a legal primacy to the 
ICRC over other humanitarian institutions but is rather an acknowledgement 
of the existence of the ICRC as an interlocutor to the states in the operation of 
the ICRC, and is a result of the recognition of the long history of the ICRC. 
As the ICRC is the oldest institution in the field of humanitarian activities, the 
references to the ICRC in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Proto-
cols are an acknowledgement of respect for the ICRC but this does not imply 
that other humanitarian organizations may not act as well. This can be inferred 
from the provisions that the section below shall now explore. 
It is appropriate to look at the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
Additional Protocols thereto due to the universal acceptance of them by the 
international community – 194 countries have acceded to the Geneva Conven-
tions, in whole or with reservations.91 A survey of the Geneva Conventions 
and the Additional Protocols thereto lead to the view that they encourage the 
activity of humanitarian organizations other than the ICRC. Indeed, common 
Article 3(2) of the 1949 Geneva Convention I, Geneva Convention II, Geneva 
Convention III, Geneva Convention IV states: 
89  The Conventions of 12 August 1949.
90  Ibid. 
91  Accessible at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_
NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=375 (accessed on 12 August 2019)
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“The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial hu-
manitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.” (emphasis added)
Although the ICRC is explicitly referred to in that Article, other humani-
tarian organizations, critically, are not legally prevented from operating. The 
term “such as” signifies that the ICRC is merely an example among other 
humanitarian bodies. The direct reference to the ICRC does not make it the 
exclusive humanitarian organization. 
Article 9 of the Geneva Conventions I, II, III and Article 10 Geneva Con-
vention IV provides: 
“The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the 
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red 
Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject 
to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the 
protection of wounded and sick, medical personnel and chaplains, and for 
their relief.” (emphasis added)
True, the ICRC possesses an explicitness in this provision, just as in the 
previous provision. But the article also makes it clear that other humanitar-
ian bodies may offer their services too, just like the ICRC. The humanitarian 
activities of another organization “within” the system of the Geneva Conven-
tions are legal and do not violate international humanitarian law and interna-
tional law.  
Article 10 (3) of the Geneva Conventions I, II and III and Article 11 (3) of 
the Geneva Convention IV states: 
“If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining power shall 
request or shall accept, subject to the provisions of this article, the offer of 
the services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions per-
formed by Protecting Powers under the present Convention.” (emphasis 
added)
Thus, like the explicitly mentioned ICRC, any other humanitarian organi-
zation has the right and the freedom to fill the gap left by the protecting power 
under the Geneva Conventions.  
In a similar manner, Article 56(3), Geneva Convention III pertaining to 
labour detachments stipulates: 
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“The camp commander shall keep an up-to-date record of the labour de-
tachments dependent on his camp, and shall communicate it to the del-
egates of the Protecting Power, of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, or of other agencies giving relief to prisoners of war, who 
may visit the camp.” (emphasis added) 
Thus, other relief organizations may also receive the records of a prisoner 
of war camp’s labour detachments.  
Moreover, Article 73 and Article 75 of the Geneva Convention III state 
that shipments by the ICRC or any other organization are protected by law. 
As such, with regards to the protection of their shipments and cargoes, other 
organizations are on an equal footing with the ICRC. 
Article 30 (3) of Geneva Convention IV provides: 
“Apart from the visits of the delegates of the Protecting Powers and of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, provided for by Article 143, 
the Detaining or Occupying Powers shall facilitate as much as possible 
visits to protected persons by the representatives of other organizations 
whose object is to give spiritual aid or material relief to such persons.” 
(emphasis added)
This also testifies to the fact that, other organizations may also provide aid. 
Article 59 of Geneva Convention IV (1,2) states: 
“If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inad-
equately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on 
behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means 
at its disposal. Such schemes, which may be undertaken either by States 
or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, shall consist, in particular, of the provision 
consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing.” (emphasis 
added)
As in the previous examples, although the ICRC is explicitly mentioned, 
other humanitarian organizations may also undertake relief schemes. 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Article 5(3) states: 
“If a Protecting Power has not been designated or accepted from the be-
ginning of a situation referred to in Article 1, the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross, without prejudice to the right of any other impartial 
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humanitarian organization to do likewise, shall offer its good offices to 
the Parties to the conflict with a view to the designation without delay of a 
Protecting Power to which the parties to the conflict consent.” 
Hence, other impartial humanitarian organizations are on an equal footing 
with the ICRC in terms of offering their good offices as to the process of the 
designation of Protecting Powers.  
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions Article 5(4) states: 
“If, despite the foregoing, there is no Protecting Power, the parties to the 
conflict shall accept without delay an offer which may be made by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross or by any other organization 
which offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy, after due consul-
tations with the said Parties and taking into account the result of these 
consultations, to act as a substitute.” (emphasis added)
Therefore, any other organization, and not just the ICRC, may be a substi-
tute for a Protecting Power via the consent of the parties to the conflict.  
Likewise, Article 60 (1,2), Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions states that agreements on demilitarized zones can be made through any 
impartial humanitarian organization, and not just through the ICRC.  
Finally, Article 81(4) of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions states: 
“The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall, as 
far as possible, make facilities similar to those mentioned in paragraphs 
2 and 3 available to the other humanitarian organizations referred to 
in the Conventions and this Protocol which are duly authorized by the 
respective Parties to the conflict and which perform their humanitarian 
activities in accordance with the provisions of the Conventions and this 
Protocol.” (emphasis added)
Hence, other humanitarian organizations can act under this protocol. 
All those aforementioned provisions clearly reject any exclusiveness 
whatsoever of the ICRC in respect of the provision of humanitarian assis-





The ICRC is explicitly mentioned in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto. These explicit references to the ICRC 
entail respect for and recognition of the ICRC as the oldest humanitarian in-
stitution. However, this explicitness does not imply, suggest or confirm legal 
superiority of the ICRC over other humanitarian institutions, nor does it make 
the ICRC the exclusive humanitarian organization. Humanitarian assistance 
can be legally and legitimately undertaken by other humanitarian organiza-
tions as well. 
In addition to foundational treaties, the ICRC’s status has been strength-
ened by the recognition of the ICRC as a partner by governments and inter-
national organizations and the acknowledgement of the ICRC’s humanitarian 
activities on the ground. As humanitarian law is partially based upon custom-
ary law, the ICRC practice and the acknowledgement of this practice by states 
and international organizations have reinforced the ICRC’s status within in-
ternational humanitarian law and international law. The ICRC has come to 
possess an “accumulated” functional international legal personality of sorts, 
although, it must be stressed, not a full-fledged one. 
This is unique in that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are not 
deemed as subjects of international law. Rather, NGOs are confined within the 
borders of their national jurisdictions. An NGO is under the authority and the 
supervision of the national law of the state in which it is established. How-
ever, the ICRC has, arguably, and perhaps demonstrably, overstepped Swiss 
national borders and has succeeded in projecting itself as a de facto subject 
of international law. The ICRC is recognised and acknowledged as an inter-
locutor by many states and international organizations, the latter both being 
undisputed subjects of international law. Arguably, the ICRC fills a gap left 
by the liberal international order as constituted by governments, international 
organizations, international law and treaties, which is perhaps why the ICRC 
is granted such leeway. 
The practical influence of the ICRC is greater than that of any other NGO. 
Arguably, the survival of the ICRC as the pre-eminent provider of humanitar-
ian assistance is testimony to the fact that the “practicalities” of international 
law are as important as treaties. The practices of the undisputed subjects of in-
ternational law – states and international organizations – have paved way for a 
half-subject of international law – the ICRC – to enhance its status. To be sure, 
this practically enhanced status is facilitated by the favourable wording and 
a flexible and favourable interpretation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
the 1977 Additional Protocols. Hence, while the proactive engagement of the 
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ICRC with international humanitarian law reflects the ICRC’s humanitarian 
purposes, it may also be regarded as an attempt by the ICRC to further solidify 
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